# Department of Electronics 

Cryptography
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## Zero-Knowledge Technique

- Thieves set up a fake automatic teller machine at a shopping mall
- When a person inserted a bank card and typed in an identification number, the machine recorded the information but responded with the message that it could not accept the card.
- The thieves then made counterfeit bank cards and went to legitimate teller machines and withdrew cash, using the identification numbers they had obtained



## Zero-Knowledge Techniques

- How can this be avoided?
- There are several situations where someone reveals a secret identification number or password in order to complete a transaction.
- Anyone who obtains this secret number, pins some (almost public) identification information (for example, the information on a bank card), can masquerade as this person.
- What is needed is a way to use the secret number without giving any information that can be reused by an eavesdropper.
- This is where zero-knowledge techniques come in.


## The Challenge-response Protocol

- The basic challenge-response protocol is best illustrated by an example due to Quisquater, Guillou, and Berson |Quisquater et al.]
- Suppose there is a tunnel with a door
- Peggy (the prover) wants to prove to Victor (the verifier) that she can go through the door without giving any information to Victor about how she does it.
- She doesn't even want to let Victor know which direction she can pass through the door (otherwise, she could simply walk down one side and emerge from the other).


## The Challenge-response Protocol

- Peggy enters the tunnel and goes down either the left side or the right side of the tunnel.
- Victor waits outside for a minute, then comes in and stands at point B
- He calls out "Left" or "Right" to Peggy
- Peggy then comes to point B by the left or right tunnel, as requested
- This entire protocol is repeated several times, until Victor is satisfied in each round
- Peggy randomly chooses which side she
 will go down, and Victor randomly chooses which side he will request.
- Since Peggy must choose to go down the left or right side before she knows what Victor will say, she has only a $50 \%$ chance of fooling Victor if she doesn't know how to go through the door.
- Therefore, if Peggy comes out the correct side for each of 10 repetitions, there is only one chance in $2^{\wedge} 10=1024$ that Peggy doesn't know how to go through the door.
- At this point, Victor is probably convinced, though he could try a few more times just to be sure.


## Eve

- Suppose Eve is watching the proceedings on a video monitor
- She will not be able to use anything she sees to convince Victor or anyone else that she, too, can go through the door.
- Moreover, she might not even be convinced that Peggy can go through the door.
- After all, Peggy and Victor could have planned the sequence of rights and lefts ahead of time.
- By this reasoning, there is no useful information that Victor obtains that can be transmitted to anyone.


## Proof

- Note that there is never a proof, in a strict mathematical sense, that Peggy can go through the door
- But there is overwhelming evidence, obtained through a series of challenges and responses.
- This is a feature of zero-knowledge "proofs."


## Mathematical Version of the Procedure

- There are several mathematical versions of this procedure, but we'll concentrate on one of them
- Let $n=p q$ be the product of two large primes
- Let $y$ be a square $\bmod n$ with $\operatorname{gcd}(\mathrm{y}, \mathrm{n})=1$
- Recall that finding square roots mod $n$ is hard; in fact, finding square roots $\bmod n$ is equivalent to factoring $n$
- However, Peggy claims to know a square root $s$ of $y$
- Victor wants to verify this, but Peggy does not want to reveal $s$.


## Method...continued...

1. Peggy chooses a random number $r_{1}$ and lets $\tau_{2} \equiv s r_{1}^{-1}(\bmod n)$, so

$$
r_{1} r_{2} \equiv s \quad(\bmod n)
$$

She computes

$$
x_{1} \equiv \tau_{1}^{2}, \quad x_{2} \equiv r_{2}^{2} \quad(\bmod n)
$$

and sends $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ to Victor.
2. Victor checks that $x_{1} x_{2} \equiv y(\bmod n)$, then chooses either $x_{1}$ or $x_{2}$ and asks Peggy to supply a square root of it. He checks that it is an actual square root.
3. The first two steps are repeated several times, until Victor is convinced.

- Of course, if Peggy knows $s$, the procedure proceeds without problems
- But what if Peggy doesn't know a square root of $y$ ?
- She can still send Victor two numbers $x_{1}$ and $x_{2}$ with $x_{1} x_{2}=y$. If she knows a square root of $x_{1}$ and a square root of $x_{2}$, then she knows a square root of $y$ $=x_{1} x_{2}$
- Therefore, for at least one of them, she does not know a square root
- At least half the time, Victor is going to ask her for a square root she doesn't know.
- Since computing square roots is hard, she is not able to produce the desired answer, and therefore Victor finds out that she doesn't know $s$.

